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REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
JONATHAN MACEY·
The Federalist vision of representative democracy is a topic
no less important today than it was in the days of the Framers.
We all agree that we live in a representative democracy.l Mod-
em political practitioners, however, draw the wrong inferences
from this fact. The Federalist vision of representative democ-
racy should actually be treated as two separate inquiries. The
first asks, "What do representatives do?" and the response is
embodied by the opposing pluralist and Burkean paradigms of
the representative's role.2 The second inquiry asks, "What is
the role of democracy within our system of constitutional
design?" and the response is that democracy should serve
either to legitimize or to check government.3 The dominant
contemporary response to these topics in the United States
favors the idea that democracy serves a legitimizing function.
That approach is ahistorical, inefficient, and intellectually
impoverished.
Historians and political scientists have pointed to two com-
peting paradigms of representation.4 The pluralist vision con-
siders the representative an advocate for his particular
constituency.5 This is both the dominant historical and current
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1. By "representative democracy" I refer to our constitutional system of govern-
ment, whereby individuals elect fellow citizens to serve as their "representatives." I do
not mean to approach the question of whether this system adequately represents the
interests of all, a subject on which opinions may differ.
2. Of these paradigms, only pluralism can actually survive in practice. See infra notes
4-7 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes B-ll and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 161-75 (1967). As regards the history of representation in America's representa-
tive democracy, Bailyn noted the following:
In England the practice of "virtual" representation provided reasonably well
for the actual representation of the major interests of the society, and it raised
no widespread objection. It was its opposite, the idea ofrepresentation as at-
torneyship, that was seen as "a new sort of political doctrine strenuously en-
forced by modern malcontents." But in the colonies the situation was
reversed. There, where political experience had led to a different expectation
of the process of representation and where the workings ofvirtual representa-
tion ... were seen to be damaging, the English argument was met at once with
flat and universal rejection, [and] ultimately with derision.... What count[ed]
... was the extent to which representation worked to protect the interests of
the people against the encroachments of government.
[d. at 167.
5. See id. at 162-75.
HeinOnline -- 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 50 1993
50 HaroardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 16
view. The other vision, ofBurkean origin, holds that represent-
atives are guardians, promoting neither their own narrow inter-
ests nor those of their constituents, but rather the broader
interests of society as a whole.6
Two points must be made about these competing concep-
tions of representation. First, as a historical matter, the Fram-
ers-particularly the revolutionaries-soundly rejected the idea
of guardianship in favor of the idea of advocacy.7 Second, and
more important, the Burkean idea of representatives acting as
paternalistic guardians not only lacks support from the Fram-
ers, but is incapable of establishing a stable equilibrium. Every
political situation in a representative democracy entails two ba-
sic conditions: rivalrous competition for political office and an
inherent conflict between the private interests of a politician's
constituency and the interests of society in the aggregate.
Given these conditions, the Burkean, other-regarding tradition
lacks necessary survival characteristics and can yield at best a
temporary equilibrium. Imagine, for example, that two people
are running against one another for a political office. One says,
"For the good of the republic, I'm going to do X, Y, and Z, but
it will cost everyone, including the members of my constitu-
ency, five dollars." The other responds, "Forget the republic,
I'm going to bring home the bacon to this constituency and it
will profit them five dollars." Predictably, the second person
will win the election. Thus, over time self-interested constitu-
ency promoters will dominate in competitions for political of-
fice.8 Representative democracy of the modern pluralist bring-
6. See id; see also EDMUND BURKE, BURKE'S POLITICS 494-95 (Ross J.S. Hoffman & Paul
Levack eds., 1949). Burke defined virtual representation as follows:
Virtual representation is that in which there is a communion ofinterests and a
sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any
description of people and the people in whose name they act, though the
trustees are not actually chosen by them.
Id. at 494.
7. Because the idea of guardianship led to the conclusion that the people of the
United States could be represented by their English counterparts, .. 'virtual representa-
tion' anywhere, under any conditions, was 'too ridiculous to be regarded'" in the
American colonies. BAILYN, supra note 4. at 169 (quotingJqhn Dickinson. An Essay on the
Constitutional Power of Great Britain over the Colonies in America (Philadelphia. 1774). re·
printed in 3 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHrvES, 2d Ser., at 594).
8. See Eugene Hickok, Jr., Congress, Representation and the Public Interest, reprinted in THE
NEW FEDERAUST PAPERS 114, 116 (J.Jackson Barlow et al. eds., 1988)(noting that im-
provement in communication technology has exacerbated the normal popular pres-
sures on representatives, making it "virtually impossible for members of Congress to
distance themselves from the heat of the political fray and to put issues in
perspective").
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home-the-bacon variety is not an anomaly, but an unavoidable
result of evolutionary processes.
These evolutionary processes were no mystery to the Fram-
ers, but guided their conceptions of democracy.9 Yet the Fram-
ers' conception of representative democracy was vastly
different from currently prevailing views. As Edward Banfield
has pointed out, tucked away in the language of many elected
representatives today is the idea that they epitomize legitimacy
because they are elected representatives, and that it is the peo-
ple-the voters-who rule. Io The 'Federalists' conception of
representative democracy, however, rejected the idea that the
purpose of majority rule and the election of representatives
was to legitimize government and thereby to empower elected
representatives. Rather, the Federalists saw democracy as a
check on government because it allowed citizens to unseat in-
competent rulers and thereby align the interests of governmen-
tal actors with those of the electorate. II This understanding of
representative democracy was strongly influenced by John
Locke, who believed that the purpose of democracy was to al-
low the people to judge their government. I2 The current idea
that the people rule through democratic processes thus stands
in stark contrast to Locke as well. The Framers' idea of a de-
mocracy in which people would sit not as rulers, but as judges
able to check the legislature, has been lost in the United
States. I3
What is wrong with the notion that the people rule? The idea
9. SeeJoseph Bessette, Deliberate Democracy: The Majority Principle in Government, in How
DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 104, 104-09 (Robert Goldwin & William Schambra
eds., 1980).
10. See generally EDWARD C. BANFIELD, HERE THE PEOPLE RULE 23-37 (2d ed.
1991)(arguing that the direct election of senators creates stronger links between the
people and Washington, thus creating greater governmental legitimacy).
II. See THE FEDERAUST No. 10, at 82-83 Games Madison)(Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961):
As each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the
large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candi-
dates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often
carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to
center on men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive
and established characters.
12. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 330,331-32 (Peter Laslett ed.,
student ed. 1988)(3d ed. 1698). Locke observed that every man "by consenting with
others to make one Body Politick under one Government, puts himself under an Obli-
gation to every one of that Society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and
to be concluded by it ....n Id. at 332 (emphasis in original).
13. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
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is extremely popular in the United States. In the voting rights
cases, for example, the Supreme Court noted that voting is im-
portant because it is a process by which people can protect
their rights. 14 In this interpretation the Court was misguided.
The Federalists knew the dangers that accompanied the rule of
the people and proposed instead a constitutional regime of
checks and balances designed to prevent a majority, united by a
common interest, from attempting to deprive members ofa mi-
nority of their rights. The point is made throughout The Federal-
ist Papers and is especially clear in The Federalist Number 51. 15
Voting can simply be a method by which a majority imposes its
will upon, and thereby denies the rights of, the minority. 16 To
this extent, the Supreme Court's endorsement of voting as a
way to protect rights was at best overly optimistic, and at worst
the realization of the fears of the Federalists. The notion that
"the people rule" through democracy is a palliative fraught
with peril for members of the minority. To view democracy as
legitimating, then, is to reduce one's vigilance against abuses
by the majority, which are best combatted through vigorous
use of checking devices.
Another problem with the current notion that democracy
serves a legitimating rather than a checking function is that, as
the Supreme Court has pointed out, one of the goals of the
Constitution was to preserve a common market among the
states and thus to promote a market system. 17 Yet markets can-
14. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)(HThe right of suffrage is
a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society....[that] is preservative ofother
basic civil and political rights....n).
15. See THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 323-24 (James Madison)(Clinton Rossiter cd.,
1961):
It is ofgreat importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injus-
tice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of
citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minor-
ity will be insecure.... This view of the subject must particularly recommend
a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republi-
can government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the
Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States, op-
pressive combinations ofa majority will be facilitated; the best security, under
the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizen, will be dimin-
ished; and consequently the stability and independence of some member of
the government, the only other security, must be proportionally increased.
16. This is embodied, for example, by the post-Civil War ':Jim Crow" laws which,
through legislation backed by the white majority, oppressed the black minority in the
South.
17. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218
(1984)(holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies to discrimination by
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not survive in a world of unfettered majority sovereignty for
two reasons. First, the mqjority will attempt to redistribute
wealth not only to increase the aggregate social welfare and
promote some vision of justice, but also to serve the narrow
purposes of particular interest groupS.18 Second, and more im-
portantly, economic success requires entrepreneurs and other
venturesome people to make specialized investments ofcapital.
These specialized investments, however, leave the investors
open to political expropriation. As firms grow in investment
size, regulators have an incentive to lower the firms' share of
profits once the investment has taken place, thereby transfer-
ring wealth from the entrepreneurial minority to the consum-
ing majority.19 The consequence of this increased risk, from
the standpoint of aggregate social welfare, is that entrepre-
neurs become less willing to invest, which obviously imposes a
tremendous social cost and impedes market operations.
In order to avoid these consequences, we should adopt the
Framers' historical vision of representative democracy. This vi-
sion is one in which democracy serves a checking function
rather than a legitimating function. The Framers provided a
system of government that is rife with "checking" devices, such
as judicial review, checks and balances, the separation of pow-
ers, and the executive veto. All of these devices were designed
to reduce the efficacy of majoritarianism in a democratic system
and to increase the decision costs of government. Yet if one
looks at developments in the internal rules governing the post-
revolutionary Congress-from the committee system to at-
tempts at the legislative veto-the hallmark of the changes has
been the reduction of these very decision costs.20
municipalities against state workers because such policies undermine "interstate har-
mony"); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-3 (1978)(holding that
"all objects of interstate trade" merit Commerce Clause protection); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)(holding that Congress's interstate commerce
power is "complete in itself ... and acknowledges no limitations other than are pre-
scribed in the Constitution").
18. See, e.g. ,James Madison, Note to 7 August 1787 Speech (1821), reprinted in THE MIND
OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OFJAMES MADISON 503-04 (Mar-
vin Meyers ed., 1973)(railing against "agrarian laws and other levelling schemes" in-
tended to redistribute wealth and benefit the poor).
19. See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Pub. Law No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992). Six years after deregulating cable com-
munications to promote competition, Congress has now reregulated the industry for
the benefit ofconsumers by enhancing the power of regulatory authorities to influence
pricing, programming, consumer service, and distribution.
20. See, e.g., IRVING S. SHAPIRO, AMERICA'S THIRD REVOLUTION 71-92 (1984). "[I]n
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While our government's anti-majoritarian superstructure has
not been altered, its internal mechanisms have gradually been
worn down by the current attitude that representative democ-
racy serves to legitimate government. This empowers Congress
by giving its actions a false aura oflegitimacy and prompts it to
act without concern for the thoughts of those who elected it in
the first place. As a result, we have resurrected and perverted
the "other-regarding" Burkean notion of representation: in-
stead of disinterested guardians acting for the good of the na-
tion regardless of their constituents' demands, we have created
a battalion of self-interested career politicians who often act for
personal gain regardless of their constituents' demands.21 We
ought to move away from this problem in modern constitu-
tional law, in which theorists wring their hands over the so-
called countermajoritarian difficulty, and recognize the obvi-
ous. The idea of a countermajoritarian governmental s'tructure
was something the Framers considered and embraced wholly.
Were we to embrace once again the notion that democracy
serves a checking function best exercised by throwing the ras-
cals out, we might take action against our sea of elected trou-
bles, and by opposing, end them.
the past two decades, in a well-meant effort to make government more democratic, we
have managed as a nation to fragment it to the point where it is strongly biased toward
expedients and has lost most ofits capacity to think in terms ofdurable policies." Id. at
72-73.
21. One need only look to the recent "check-kiting" and other "perk-of-office" scan-
dals that have plagued Congress in the opinion polls for confirmation of this observa-
tion. See, e.g., Clarence Page, House Bank Scandal Catches Congress With Its Ethics Down,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 3, 1992, at 21; Art Pine, Perks Tum House Into Cozy Home; The Notorious
Bank ofthe Bad-Check Scandal Is]ust One Congressional Privilege, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992,
at AI. See generally SUZANNE GARMENT, SCANDAL: THE CULTURE OF MISTRUST IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS (l991)(discussing scandalous behavior by elected officials that has cre-
ated a "culture of mistrust" among the exasperated and often disgusted electorate).
